Each January, the Disciplinary Board's communications team reviews the disciplinary decisions from the previous year and identify a list of the cases of greatest interest, looking for cases that involve unusual or remarkable fact situations, cases that involve interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or the rules and procedures governing disciplinary proceedings, and cases examining issues arising from technology or emerging patterns in the practice of law. The following cases caught our eye in 2024:
- Michael Eric Adler, among other matters, pursued a case against a pet food company in which he repeatedly misstated the chemistry of the products at issue in social media posts, accusing the company of producing unsafe products and of stonewalling him, when he did not understand the chemistry explained to him by counsel for the company. He also copied an email to members of the board of directors of the company without the knowledge or permission of the company’s counsel. This was found to violate RPC 4.1(a) (false statements to a third party) and 4.2 (communicating with a party represented by another lawyer). For this and misconduct in four other cases, he was suspended for one year and one day.
- Lesley Rae Childers-Potts agreed to a suspension for two years based on her conduct while serving as a county District Attorney. She failed to diligently prosecute cases and to take other actions necessary to discharge her duties in four cases, three of which resulted in court orders dismissing proceedings due to the failure of the District Attorney’s office to diligently proceed with the cases or file required documents. At times, she was the only attorney in the District Attorney’s office.
- Robert Scott Clewell admitted to an extensive pattern of misconduct including neglect, misrepresentation of the status of cases, and failure to earn or refund fees. He asserted that his misconduct was “contextualized” by a pattern of depression and anxiety that prevented him from taking necessary actions. The Board engaged in an extensive discussion of mental health issues and whether these factors are mitigating under the terms of prior cases involving mental disability defenses. Although Clewell did not offer psychiatric testimony to meet the standard of mitigation defined in those cases, the Board considered his testimony as to the mental health issues he experienced as context for understanding his pattern of misconduct. He was suspended for two years.
- J. Conor Corcoran was retained by an imprisoned client to represent him in a police brutality case. When the client’s son was killed by a police officer, Corcoran filed a lawsuit naming the client individually and as administrator of his son’s estate as plaintiffs although he had not spoken to or been retained by the client regarding that issue and no estate had been opened. He also failed to name the son’s mother who was represented by other counsel. Even after the client refused to sign a fee agreement and retained other counsel, he continued to attempt to represent the client and filed a petition seeking to have the client declared incapacitated, in which he revealed confidential client information. He then filed a lawsuit claiming to be administrator of the client’s estate on the basis of the client’s incapacity, along with other misrepresentations. He filed other documents which had no merit and contained misrepresentations and threatened to sue the client’s retained counsel for tortious interference. He admitted that his actions were motivated by the desire to obtain a large contingent fee from the representation. He agreed to a suspension for eighteen months.
- Emeka Igwe was found to have charged a clearly excessive fee. He asserted a claim for both a flat fee of $40,000 for services to obtain the proceeds of a child’s special needs trust, which was awarded to the client without any efforts on his part, and a 40% contingent fee for a suit against the child’s father should he assert a claim to the trust which the father did not. Igwe received a public reprimand.
- Steven Ostroff rented a property to a pizza business that fell behind on rent. He terminated the lease and took possession. The business owner reached an agreement to sell the assets of the business and retained Ostroff to draft the sales agreement. Ostroff prepared a document naming himself as the seller. He received and kept the proceeds of the sale. When the owner sued to obtain the proceeds, he asserted a counterclaim that was not meritorious and subsequently filed the same claim in another court. He stipulated that this conduct violated Rules of Professional Conduct related to conflicts of interest, handling of client funds, and conduct involving dishonesty and prejudicial to the administration of justice. He agreed to a suspension for one year which will not require him to file a petition for reinstatement.
- Nathaniel Edmond Strasser appeared at a preliminary hearing on behalf of a client at which a police officer skilled in drug detection noticed signs of cocaine use in his appearance and behavior. After being confronted about this, he tested positive for cocaine. At his disciplinary hearing in which he represented himself, he denied being addicted, and in his cross-examination of the trooper who recognized his symptoms, he suggested cocaine use “increases your awareness” and stated, “My mental awareness was at a heightened state, not a lower state.” After the hearing, he retained counsel who filed a motion seeking to reopen the hearing to provide evidence of addiction and treatment, but the motion was denied. He was suspended for one year and one day.
- Robert Philip Tuerk sought reinstatement from disbarment. The Disciplinary Board conducted a searching examination of the issue of his rehabilitation. It found that he “leaves a trail of tribunals over many years who have found that he mischaracterizes his discipline, fails to accept responsibility, and is not credible.” It found that, far from accepting responsibility for his past misconduct, he would often “soft pedal” and minimize it. For this and other reasons, reinstatement was denied.
- William J. Weiss was suspended for a year and a day on consent. After the effective date of his suspension, he engaged in prohibited law-related activities when he appeared at three court conferences, one of which he was introduced by another attorney representing the client as his assistant. For this conduct, and due to substantial aggravating circumstances, he was suspended for five years.
- Andrew Scott Ziegler agreed to a suspension for one year and one day after admitting that he represented clients on the side in violation of the terms of his employment by a law firm, failed to inform the firm of his practice on the side and created duplicate records to conceal the practice and to divert fees into his own accounts.
The Court issued an opinion in the following case that is for an unnamed attorney. In a decision dated October 24, 2024, in the case of Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Anonymous Attorney, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissed a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney and held that a petition for attorney fees requesting clearly excessive fees did not violate the prohibition on such fees of Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, nor did it constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d).
The lawyer charged in the proceeding represented a plaintiff in the U.S. District Court for a contractual uninsured motorist claim and a bad faith claim under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371. The lawyer was retained on a contingent fee agreement. His firm obtained a settlement of the UIM case for $25,000 but proceeded to a weeklong trial on the bad faith claim which resulted in a verdict in his clients’ favor for $100,000. Respondent filed a petition seeking $946,526 for attorney fees and costs and $175,630 in interest, for a total of $1,122,156. After submission of documents and an evidentiary hearing, the district court judge deemed the request for attorneys’ fees “outrageous and abusively excessive.” The court reached this conclusion after finding that the petition contained duplicative, vague, unnecessary, and excessive entries. The petition also claimed attorneys’ fees for clerical functions including file maintenance and document management. The court determined that only about thirteen percent of the claimed attorneys’ fees were supported by the evidence. It denied the attorneys' fees petition in its entirety and directed that a copy of its opinion be served on the Pennsylvania Chief Disciplinary Counsel. Respondent also self-reported the opinion to ODC on the same day. The decision was upheld by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Disciplinary Board found that Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by charging a clearly excessive fee. It did not find violations of any of the other rules charged, including Rule 8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. It recommended that the Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for ninety days.
The Respondent filed a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court. In its decision, written by Justice Donahue, the Supreme Court found that no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct were proven.
Much of the opinion of the Supreme Court opinion addresses whether the Respondent’s conduct constituted charging or collected an illegal or clearly excessive fee in violation of Rule 1.5(a). The Supreme Court noted that Rule 1.5 is contained within Chapter One of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct which governs the “client-lawyer relationship.” It concluded that the prohibition “enter[ing] into an agreement for, charg[ing], or collect[ing] an illegal or clearly excessive fee” applies only to the lawyer’s relationship with the client and not to a petition for award of attorney fees to the client from an adverse party filed for the approval of a court. The Court noted, “The plain language of Rule 1.5(a) makes clear that its aim is to protect clients from being charged clearly excessive fees.” It concluded, “Rule 1.5(a) serves an important role in ensuring that attorneys do not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee from their clients. Based on the language of the rule and its placement within the Rules of Professional Conduct, we hold that Rule 1.5(a) does not apply where an attorney files a fee petition seeking to recover fees on behalf of his client from an adverse party.”
Although the Disciplinary Board did not find any other violations, the Supreme Court requested briefing on whether the Respondent’s conduct constituted prejudice to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). The Office of Disciplinary Counsel argued the Respondent caused prejudice to the administration of justice by submitting and litigating “an unsupported, vague and poorly reasoned fee petition, even though the district court gave him the opportunity to supplement it” and that this conduct “set in motion a series of events that significantly inconvenienced the district court, wasted limited judicial resources, and negatively impacted the administration of justice.” The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that in prior cases violations of Rule 8.4(d) were sustained only when lawyers engaged an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice through misrepresentation or other dishonest misuse of the legal system for improper means, when an attorney actually undermines proceedings through deception, or when their conduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct otherwise obstructs the court’s functions in administering justice. It stated that the expense of time and judicial resources in a court proceeding does not equate with the type of prejudice that substantively affects the outcome of the proceedings which has been found to support a violation of Rule 8.4(d) in prior cases. The Court concluded, “We find that neither Rule 1.5(a) nor 8.4(d) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct apply under the circumstances of this appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the Disciplinary Board, is reversed and the Petition for Discipline is dismissed.”