Supreme Court Suspends Philadelphia Attorney for Extensive Misconduct
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Order dated November 19, 2024, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania suspended Philadelphia attorney Joseph D. Lento, accepting a 134-page report from the Disciplinary Board that documented an extensive history of neglect, misrepresentation, and other misconduct in several cases.
Lento led a busy practice, overseeing three law firms and a number of legal and paralegal staff. He acknowledged that he operated a “pragmatic practice of law” in which he did not take notes of client interviews, did not employ an electronic case management system, and did not enter his appearance in cases where he had been retained so that he is “not attached to the case.” He admitted that under this kind of practice, “Certain things may not be done as may be required.” Two attorneys who were employed by law firms under Lento’s management testified as to chaotic office practice, “management by crisis,” information only shared on a “need to know basis,” and a general lack of supervision and guidance.
The Disciplinary Board examined six cases in which Lento represented clients. It found numerous instances of failing to meet deadlines, failing to effectively represent clients, asserting arguments not supported by the law, failing to research the law, failing to supervise subordinates and review documents prepared, lack of competence, misinforming clients as to the merits of their cases, and misleading clients as to the status of cases. He also filed documents containing the signatures of other attorneys without their knowledge and consent. He engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by accepting a student rights case and corresponding with a university president in Georgia, where he was not admitted to practice.
The Disciplinary Board found numerous violations of twenty of the Rules of Professional Conduct in this pattern of conduct. The Board cited as aggravating factors Lento’s prior discipline in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, including three prior one-year suspensions. The Board also found that he had failed to express regret or acknowledge his wrongdoing, blaming his clients, employees, and other attorneys for his misconduct. It found his testimony evasive and not credible. He claimed the Office of Disciplinary Counsel had not met its burden of proof because his testimony contradicted that of the witnesses, and the complaints were a matter of “he said, she said.” The Disciplinary Board rejected this argument, noting that the Special Master made careful and reasonable findings of credibility. He presented character witnesses in mitigation although the Board noted they had limited or no familiarity with the conduct in question.
On the determination of discipline, the Board noted that Lento’s conduct in the six cases showed “a predatory style of taking on client representation, failing to ascertain whether the client’s goals could be accomplished,” and thereby “placed profit over professionalism.” After reviewing the caselaw and the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Board determined that a suspension for five years was the appropriate discipline. The Supreme Court concurred, suspending Lento for five years.
California Bar Recommends Expungement of Disciplinary Records After Eight Years
The State Bar of California has asked the Supreme Court of California to consider a
rule allowing expungement of the records of all disciplinary sanctions, other than disbarments, after eight years.
At its November 14th meeting, the State Bar of California’s Board of Trustees
approved a proposed rule change that would automatically expunge attorney discipline records short of disbarment after eight years, assuming no further discipline has since occurred.
The recommendation drew, to some extent, on a 2019 study, commissioned by the state bar, that found significant disparities in the disciplinary treatment of minorities. Specifically, the study found that Black male attorneys, who make up just 1% of the bar, were three times more likely than their White counterparts to be disciplined by probation. Another working group
recommended that disciplinary actions other than disbarment should be expunged on a sliding scale from one to five years.
A state bar staff memo
reported that the proposed expungement policy would more closely align California with attorney discipline policies in other states and with California’s oversight of doctors, nurses, and real estate appraisers. The memo also cited a survey which found that 69% of eighty-one attorney respondents supported the proposal in its current form or with modifications, but 84% of the 311 nonlawyer respondents were opposed.
Lawyer Disbarred for Racist and Antisemitic Disciplinary Complaints
A New York lawyer
has been disbarred after a court found that, among an extensive pattern of similar misconduct, he filed three disciplinary complaints with the Attorney Grievance Commission that were full of racist and antisemitic language.
The New York Appellate Division for the First Judicial Department
issued an order disbarring New York attorney Rahul Dev Manchanda. The court adopted the findings of a referee based on a petition by the Attorney Grievance Commission (AGC). The AGC initiated an investigation
sua sponte after Manchanda filed three complaints with the AGC and the Human Rights Council in 2021, each containing racist and antisemitic language. When the AGC requested that he respond to allegations of misconduct against him, he responded again with racist and antisemitic rhetoric.
The investigation also looked into Manchanda’s actions in four lawsuits, including a federal court action he filed against New York and Connecticut judges involved in a custody dispute with his ex-wife in which he accused the judges and other defendants of engaging in criminal and sexually abusive conduct. The referee’s report documented abusive conduct by Manchanda in the underlying cases and also in the disciplinary proceeding. The court concluded, “Words fail to capture the severity and extent of his bigotry. The conduct here is simply shocking and outrageous.”
Lawyer Reprimanded for Unsecured Dropbox Link
An Indiana lawyer
consented to imposition of a public reprimand after admitting that he shared with a client a Dropbox link that was unsecured and provided the client with access to confidential files and information relating to other clients.
James Henry Lockwood stipulated to the facts of the matter. The recitation stated that Lockwood represented a client in a domestic matter. The client was an unpaid nonlawyer assistant in his firm when the representation began but subsequently left his employ. Lockwood provided the client with an unsecured link to a Dropbox account where confidential firm and client information was stored. When the client left Respondent’s employ, Lockwood failed to deactivate the link, affording the client continuing access to confidential information. The link remained open for nearly a year and a half.
The stipulation also stated that Lockwood threatened a lawyer who filed a grievance against him with a defamation lawsuit. When the opposing attorney informed him the Disciplinary Commission had declined to pursue the complaint, he responded, “You got lucky.”
The Court found that this conduct violated Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct 1.6 [confidentiality] and 8.4(d) [conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice].
Judge Reprimanded for Ordering Payment of Restitution – to Himself
A Tennessee judge has received a
letter of reprimand from the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct for not only presiding over a case in which he was personally involved but also ordering payment of restitution to himself.
Judge R. Steven Randolph of Putnam County, Tennessee presided over a case in which a defendant was charged only with driving without a license. The defendant did not speak English and was not represented by an attorney although an interpreter was present. The incident involved a collision resulting in damage to Judge Randolph’s truck. Randolph accepted a guilty plea and ordered the defendant to pay restitution of $590 which was for the estimated cost to repair his truck. He agreed to allow the defendant to pay in installments. However, he received no money, as a week later he set aside the guilty plea, and another judge dismissed the charges.
In response to the Board’s inquiry, Randolph asserted that the defendant had waived the issue of his disqualification, that the amount of the restitution was “miniscule,” and that any violation was technical rather than substantive. The Board disagreed, finding that Randolph should not have participated in the case at all due to his personal interest and that he failed to follow the procedure outlined in the rules by informing the defendant of his conflict of interest and giving him an opportunity to consider the decision whether to waive the conflict outside of the judge’s presence. The letter opined that requiring a litigant to pay money to a judge personally would undermine public perception and confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The letter also noted that he had a
prior reprimand for posting a comment on a school’s Instagram account, expressing his intent to use his judicial position to crack down on truancy.
Lawyer Found Very Annoying but Not Annoying Enough for an Injunction
A California lawyer so aggravated his opposing counsel that she sued to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO), barring him from contacting her. However, the trial court
dissolved the TRO it initially granted after finding that the offending lawyer’s conduct was “annoying” but not “seriously annoying.”
A multi-day hearing (
Who said it’s easy to be a judge?) detailed a pattern of behavior by lawyer Patrick Martinez toward lawyer Dawn Saenz and her staff. According to Saenz, Martinez yelled at her and at her staff, followed and menaced her in public places, and glared or stared at her. The court found Saenz credible and Martinez’s “lack of credibility” at the hearing to be “atrocious” and not in line with being “an officer of the court.” It found that Martinez’s conduct was “annoying,” “unacceptable,” and “disappointing” and that he “did those things on purpose” and was “milliseconds [sic] away from getting a restraining order granted against” him. The court concluded that Martinez had “skirted that line just enough” to avoid the “seriously annoying” standard, and so it dissolved the TRO and denied permanent relief. Saenz appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision, and, adding insult to insult, allowed Martinez to recover his costs on appeal.
In fairness, silly as the distinction between “annoying” and “seriously annoying” sounds, the language of the statute defining harassment on which Saenz relied requires that the conduct be “seriously annoying” as opposed to plain old annoying. The trial court concluded that Martinez fell just short of the line of “seriously annoying,” wherever that is.
This decision creates a need for future courts to clarify the level of annoyance at which court intervention becomes necessary. Since many lawyers are naturally annoying people, they will need clear standards in order to tailor their annoying behavior to professionally appropriate standards. We will await further guidance on this matter. (
As tone is hard to decipher in writing, you may consider this sarcasm.)
